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Equal Protection and the Passive
Enforcement System of Draft
Registration: Selective Service or
Selective Prosecution-United
States v. Wayte
By Rennika H. Thoon*
Introduction
The law works in mysterious ways. Perhaps nowhere is this more
apparent than in judicial interpretation of the open-ended Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Constitution.' Standard methodology in equal protec-
tion cases2 often seems to be mere window dressing for what goes on
behind the scenes'-the kind of intuitive decisionmaking 4 expected by
many on the outside,' but rarely acknowledged on the inside.'
* B.A., 1980, Drew University; member, third year class.
1. See Torke, The Judicial Process in Equal Protection Cases, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
279, 342 (1982). "There is, in the equal protection clause, the potential for more thoroughgo-
ing social changes than in any of the other great protective clauses of the Constitution." Id.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 103-09.
3. "[IThe emphasis on the mechanics of equal protection has resulted in insufficient at-
tention to and articulation of values, leaving these critical, value laden premises of equal pro-
tection decisions not only unexplored but also unmentioned." Torke, supra note 1, at 285.
4. "The elaborate system of shifting levels of review, of vacillating presumptions, and of
reasonableness. . . seems to move the decisionmaker logically along. . . . [H]owever, equal
protection is about moral theory, and the fusion between the two ought to be made plain." Id.
at 348 (footnote omitted) (citing R. DWORIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977)).
5. Most commentators accept the proposition that values, in addition to strict textual
interpretation, are somehow necessary for constitutional decisionmaking. See Ely, Forward:
On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5 (1978). "Right through to the
present day, the prevailing academic line has been that the Court should give content to the
Constitution's open-ended provisions by identifying and enforcing. . .America's fundamental
values." Id. at 15. See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 109 (1962); P.
BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 738 (1975). Some commentators,
however, argue that since there is no proper value source, the areas of judicial review should be
limited. See, eg., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43-72 (1980) (suggesting that only
"process-oriented" matters, and not substantive values, are the proper business of the Court).
6. "If the Court's decisions are often unconvincing, it is because the Court is not always
straight with us." Torke, supra note 1, at 348.
One recent comment supporting the unspoken rule is the frank admission of Judge J.
Skelly Wright of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. He stated:
[1491
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The standard methodology, however, is important. As a set of legal
rules evolves from precedent, it provides consistency and predictability.
It is the robe of reason that covers the underlying values of the individual
judges. Without it, the court stands naked. It is thus that the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals stands after its decision in United States v.
Wayte.
7
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's finding
of selective prosecution based on the exercise of First Amendment rights,
and reinstated an indictment against Wayte for failure to register for the
draft.' Wayte claimed that out of 500,000 men who had also failed to
register, only he and twelve other men were selected for prosecution
through a "passive enforcement system"; this system targeted only those
nonregistrants who had spoken out against the draft. Despite this fact,
the circuit court held that Wayte failed to establish selective prosecution
"[T]he key in all of this is doing justice within the law .... When I get a case I look
at it, and the first thing I think of automatically is what is right, what should be
done-and then you [sic] look at the law to see whether or not you can do it. That
might invert the process of how you should arrive at a decision-of whether you
should look at the law first-but with me it developed through making decisions
which involve resolving problems, and I'm less patient than other judges with law
that won't permit what I believe to be fair. But if you don't take it to extremes, I
think it's good to come out with a fair and just result and then look for law to
support it."
Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham, United States District Court for the Northern District of
California (quoting Judge J. Skelly Wright, in Introductory Remarks at Address by Judge
Wright, Inaugural Lecture, Matthew 0. Tobriner Lecture Series, Hastings College of the Law
(Oct. 4, 1983)).
7. 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3856 (U.S. May 29, 1984),
argued, 53 U.S.L.W. 3359 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1984) (No. 83-1292). While this Comment was at the
printer, the Supreme Court decided this case, holding that the passive policy of enforcing
Selective Service registration requirements did not violate either First Amendment free speech
or right to petition, or the Fifth Amendment equal protection componant. United States v.
Wayte, 53 U.S.L.W. 4319 (March 19, 1985).
8. Wayte was charged under 50 U.S.C. §§ 453, 462(a) (1981 & 1984 Supp.).
Section 453 provides in part:
[Iit shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other male
person residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any
subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present
himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and
in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by rules
and regulations prescribed hereunder.
Section 462(a) provides in part:
Any.. . person charged as herein provided with the duty of carrying out any of the
provisions of this title . . . , or the rules or regulations made or directions given
thereunder, who shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform such duty. . . , or who
otherwise evades or refuses registration or service in the armed forces or any of the
requirements of this title. . . or who in any manner shall knowingly fail or neglect
or refuse to perform any duty required of him under or in the execution of this title
. . . shall, upon conviction. . . ,be punished by imprisonment for not more than
five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment
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based on the exercise of a constitutional right. 9 It also ruled that Wayte
had presented no evidence that would entitle him to an evidentiary hear-
ing on the matter.10
This Comment suggests that the Ninth Circuit erred in both hold-
ings. Part I presents the factual background of the case and the circum-
stances surrounding the establishment of the passive enforcement system.
Part II provides a brief summary of selective prosecution case law, in-
cluding select cases that illustrate the developmental trend. Part III fo-
cuses on the holdings, reasoning and analysis by both the district and
circuit court with respect to two issues: (1) whether a prima facie case of
selective prosecution was established; and (2) whether the requisite show-
ing was made for an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Finally, part IV
suggests some unstated reasons for the Ninth Circuit's decision, and con-
siders its real and potential impact.
I. The Prosecution
A. Factual Background
On July 2, 1980, a proclamation issued by President Carter rein-
stated the draft." David Alan Wayte, although eligible, did not register.
Instead he wrote letters to the Selective Service Administration and Pres-
ident Carter stating that he had no intention of registering because he
had decided that he had to obey his conscience rather than the law.12 In
February 1981, Wayte sent another letter to the Selective Service restat-
ing that he had not registered, and indicating that he would be "traveling
the nation ...encouraging resistance and spreading the word about
peace and disarmament." 3 A subsequent Selective Service letter sent to
nonregistrants met with no response from Wayte.14 In October of 1981,
9. Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1387. The circuit court also reversed a separate and independent
basis for the district court's dismissal of Wayte's indictment. The district court had deter-
mined that Presidential Proclamation 4771, which reinstated the draft, was invalid under 50
U.S.C. § 463(b) (requiring 30 days before a regulation takes effect). 710 F.2d at 1388-89. The
higher court reasoned that since Presidential Proclamations are not mentioned in § 463(b), but
are referred to elsewhere in the Selective Service Act, they are exempt from its 30-day require-
ment. Id. The only district court finding left intact was the inapplicability of a 60-day notice
and comment period imposed pursuant to Executive Order 12044 issued in October, 1978. 32
C.F.R. § 1615 (1984). 710 F.2d at 1389.
10. 710 F.2d at 1388.
11. Presidential Proclamation 4771 reinstated the draft and directed male citizens and
residents born in 1960 to register with the Selective Service System during the week of July 21,
1980. 3 C.F.R. 82 (1980).
12. Brief for the United States at 3, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
13. 710 F.2d at 1386. Wayte had also appeared at public demonstrations across the coun-
try and on radio and television programs to state his dissent. Brief for the Appellee at 7,
Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
14. On June 17, 1981, the Selective Service sent warning letters by certified mail to all
nonregistrants who had expressed opposition to the draft in the media or in letters to the
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the United States Attorney for Wayte's district15 sent a letter warning
Wayte of possible prosecution.' 6 Wayte did not respond.
In December, 1981 the government imposed a moratorium on ef-
forts to prosecute nonregistrants because an overwhelming number of
men had failed to register.17 A grace period, effective until February 28,
1982, was instituted."8 An impressive array of government officials and
departments continued to meet during this period to consider a plan of
action that would best enforce registration.19 The plan ultimately
adopted was the passive enforcement system.
B. The Passive Enforcement System
According to a July 9, 1982 memorandum written by Assistant At-
torney General D. Lowell Jensen,20 the Justice Department's policy was
"designed to insure that only persons who are the most adamant in their
refusal to register [would] be prosecuted."'" Only those who had "re-
ported" themselves by writing to the government in opposition ("self-
reported" nonregistrants) or those who had publicly refused to register
would form the prosecutive pool. A dossier had been kept on each vocal
nonregistrant as part of the Selective Service's recordkeeping system
known as the "Suspected Violator Inventory System."' 22  This system
provided the government with easy access to the names of vocal
violators.
In that same memo, however, Jensen acknowledged that the Selec-
tive Service had the ability to identify silent nonregistrants for prosecu-
government. Brief for the United States at 5, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983). The letter
apprised the recipient of the registration law, and requested that he fill out an enclosed regis-
tration card and mail it to the Selective Service in a self-addressed envelope. Id. The letter
warned that unless the recipient responded within 15 days, his name would be forwarded to
the Department of Justice. Id. at 5-6.
Presumably, the letter was to be government evidence that the nonregistration had been
willful; § 462(a) of chapter 50 of the United States Code permits conviction only of those who
"knowingly fail or neglect to perform such duty." 50 U.S.C. § 462(a) (1984). Receipt of the
letter showed conclusively that the recipient had knowledge of the duty to register.
15. David Alan Wayte was a resident of the Central District of California. Brief for the
United States at 2, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
16. The letter advised Wayte that he was subject to prosecution and urged him to com-
plete and return a registration card. It stated that if Wayte did not register within three weeks,
he would be prosecuted. Id. at 7.
17. 710 F.2d at 1387.
18. Id.
19. See infra text accompanying note 40.
20. D. Lowell Jensen, Prosecution of Selective Service Non-Registrants (July 9, 1982)
(Department of Justice Memorandum), quoted in United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376,
1381-82 (C.D. Cal. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Jensen Memo].
21. Id.; Brief for the United States at 14-15, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
22. Brief for the United States at 5, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
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tion through Social Security records.2 3 In fact, he stated that the
Selective Service had "nearly implemented an 'active' enforcement" pol-
icy using those records.24 Jensen predicted that a combined "active" and
"passive" enforcement system would result in random selection of both
vocal and nonvocal nonregistrants for prosecution.25 Random selection
is constitutionally permissible.26
In an earlier letter dated March 2, 1982,27 Jensen recognized that
the passive system had "potentially serious first amendment problems
that would lead to selective prosecution claims."'28 This detailed letter
counseled that lest the government lose its first few important cases (and
thereby discourage further registration), the Selective Service would have
to start prosecuting nonvocal violators by the time of the first vocal viola-
tor prosecution.29
Similarly, in a June 29, 1982 memorandum to Attorney General
William French Smith, Jensen acknowledged that defendants singled out
23. Jensen Memo, supra note 20. The government's ability to identify silent nonregis-
trants also was emphasized by General Thomas K. Turnage, Director of the Selective Service.
His July 28, 1982 statement to the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminis-
tration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee provides: "In August, we start realizing
the results of a more active compliance program with the ultimate goal of identification of all
non-registrants. This program involves matching our Selective Service registrant files with files
of the Social Security Administration." Id. The statement was made on July 28, 1982, six
days after Wayte was indicted.
24. United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1381-82 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
25. Jensen believed that random selection was constitutionally permissible. He "predicted
that development of an 'active' enforcement program utilizing Social Security records would
finally allow the government 'to create an appropriate selection criterion, most probably one
based on randomness."' Brief for the Appellee at 6, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983)
(emphasis original).
26. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
27. Letter from D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, to Her-
bert C. Puscheck, Associate Director, Plan and Operations, Selective Service System (March 2,
1982), reprinted in part in United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1384 [hereinafter cited as
Jensen Letter]. The letter was apparently prepared by Senior Legal Advisor David J. Kline.
See infra notes 33, 37-38 and accompanying text.
28. 549 F. Supp. at 1384.
29. Jensen Letter, supra note 27. The letter stated in pertinent part:
[T]here is an even more important objection to the present scheme than that it wastes
investigative resources. The present passive identification program is liable to result
in adverse judicial decisions based on defendant claims of selective prosecution.
Unfortunately, we believe that if the government initiates prosecutions with only the
passive identification scheme in place, there exists a real risk that the United States
will lose at least a few of the initial cases. . . . Since a passive identification system
necessarily means that there will be enormous numbers of non-registrants who are
neither identified nor prosecuted, a prosecution of a vocal non-registrant will un-
doubtedly lead to claims that the prosecution is brought in retribution for the non-
registrant's exercise of his first amendment rights. See United States v. Falk, 479
F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
Brief for the Appellee at 6-7, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
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by the passive enforcement system "are liable to raise thorny selective
prosecution claims."3 ° A June 30, 1982 memorandum 31 from Jensen
marked "BACKGROUND INFORMATION NOT FOR PUBLIC RE-
LEASE" recognized that the passive system created a prosecutive pool
comprised of "a large sample of persons who object on religious and
moral grounds and persons who publicly refuse to register.
32
The selectivity of the passive enforcement system also disturbed
David J. Kline, 3 3 a United States Department of Justice advisor on the
draft law. Kline testified at the Wayte hearing that he had become "very
concerned ' 34 about the system, as early as his assignment in July 1980.
31
He tried to convince the Selective Service to adopt an active enforcement
system to identify nonregistrants instead of "simply waiting for them to
come to their [sic] attention. ' 36 Ultimately, Kline drafted the March 2,
1982 "Jensen Letter"37 to encourage "the decision makers . . . to push
for the Active Enforcement System." 38 Clearly, the equal protection
problem raised by the passive enforcement system, and its solution-ran-
dom selection--did not escape the government.
In spite of these inherent and foreseeable problems, the government
went forward with the passive enforcement system for selectively prose-
cuting only vocal nonregistrants. Ordinarily, the decision to prosecute
nonregistrants for the draft originates in the Department of Justice,
which provides names to the appropriate United States Attorney. Then
the Attorney ultimately decides whom to prosecute. 39 Among those in-
volved in this prosecutive policy determination, however, were: Presi-
dential Counselor Edwin Meese III and other White House Staff; the
Selective Service; the Justice Department in Washington, D.C.; and the
Presidential Military Manpower Task Force whose membership includes
the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Director of Selective Service, and others.' Documents disclosed by the
government imply that if the first wave of prosecutions made examples of
30. Brief for the Appellee at 6, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
31. Id. at 5. The memorandum was sent to F. Henry Habight II, Special Assistant to
Attorney General William French Smith.
32. Id. at 5-6.
33. David J. Kline is Senior Legal Advisor in the General Litigation and Legal Advice
Section in the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice. It was his func-
tion to render advice on the draft law and supervise its administration. 549 F. Supp. at 1382.
34. Brief for the Appellee at 9, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
35. Brief for the United States at 15, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
36. Id.
37. Portions of the letter were drafted by Kline, but Jensen signed it. 549 F. Supp. at 1384.
38. Brief for the Appellee at 10, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
39. 549 F. Supp. at 1382.
40. Brief for the United States at 46, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983); Wayte, 549 F.
Supp. at 1382. Membership also includes the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force,
and Presidential Advisors on National Security Affairs.
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the most vocal resisters, great numbers of men would be induced to
register.'
The intent and effect of the policy were inescapable; as Kline ob-
served, "the chance that a quiet non-registrant will be prosecuted is prob-
ably about the same as the chance that he will be struck by lightning."'42
On July 22, 1982, Wayte was indicted for failure to register for the
draft.43
II. Selective Prosecution in Equal Protection Cases
A. Case Law Development
The landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins' established the principle
that equal protection of the law is denied when otherwise valid laws are
discriminatorily enforced by state officials. Yick Wo, a Chinese laundry
operator, was convicted of violating an ordinance that banned the opera-
tion of laundries in all but brick or stone buildings unless prior consent
was obtained from the city licensing board. He had sought consent, but
it was refused, despite the safe condition of his wooden facility. The facts
showed that Chinese laundry operators were uniformly denied the re-
quired consent, while non-Chinese operators were granted consent in all
but one instance .4  The Supreme Court held that criminal enforcement
of the law in this case was, therefore, illegal.4 6
While discriminatory state action is the subject of the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection guarantee,47 the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment4 8 accords a defendant the same protection from
41. 549 F. Supp. at 1384; see infra note 172 and accompanying text.
42. Jensen Letter, supra note 20; Brief for the United States at 3, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385
(9th Cir. 1983). This statement was drafted by Kline and signed by Jensen. See supra notes
33-37 and accompanying text.
43. 549 F. Supp. at 1378. See supra note 8.
44. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
45. Id. Often, discrimination must be inferred from statistical data when prosecutorial
discretion on a case-by-case basis forms a discriminatory pattern. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STruTIONAL LAW 1026 (1978). This inference is more compelling when the prosecutive pro-
cedure itself systematically works the pattern. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text
for consideration of the role of statistical data in establishing a prima facie case.
46. 118 U.S. at 373-74. Specifically, the Court stated:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand,
so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in simi-
lar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution.
Id.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No state shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."
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discriminatory federal enforcement or prosecution.49 Selective prosecu-
tion claims may arise in a variety of contexts. This Comment analyzes
cases in which the federal government was charged with selectively pros-
ecuting those who exercised their First Amendment rights. The numer-
ous cases that do not discuss selective prosecution on this ground or that
deal with the issue only fleetingly, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
The common denominator in the selective prosecution cases that follow
is the defendant's expression of unpopular views and dissemination of
ideas that run counter to federal government policy.
Although many claims of selective prosecution have been made in
tax offense cases, it is clear that the government prosecutes both vocal
and nonvocal tax offenders.5 ° While the legal standard for selective pros-
ecution is not different for tax offenders, the practical impact is that tax
offenders must show a more individual-specific discrimination, as op-
posed to a systematic discrimination.5
Courts have developed a two-prong test for establishing a prima fa-
cie case of selective prosecution. First, the defendant must show that
others similarly situated have not been prosecuted for the same conduct.
Second, he must show that his selection was based on an improper
ground.52 Four cases53 illustrate the development and gradual recogni-
tion54 of selective prosecution claims and set the stage for the district
court decision in United States v. Wayte.55
In United States v. Crowthers,56 a law requiring a permit to assemble
at the Pentagon was enforced against individuals assembled for a prayer
service to pray for peace in Vietnam, but was not enforced against mem-
bers of several progovernment demonstrations, assembled to welcome
49. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
50. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
51. Since no government enforcement procedure focuses solely on vocal tax offenders, a
defendant will have to show that the government focused its investigation efforts on him. See
infra text accompanying notes 94, 132 and 143-46.
52. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. A court also may grant an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of selective prosecution when the defendant proffers evidence probative of
selective prosecution. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. For example, the Ninth Cir-
cuit grants an evidentiary hearing on selective prosecution when a defendant has alleged facts
sufficient to take the question beyond the frivolous stage. United States v. Erne, 576 F.2d 212,
216 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. Oaks, 508 F.2d 1403, 1404 (9th Cir. 1974), cert
denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976)). For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit standard for obtaining an
evidentiary hearing, see infra note 125.
53. United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976);
United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
54. See Comment, The Ramifications of United States v. Falk on Equal Protection from
Prosecutorial Discrimination, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 62, 63-64 n.32 (1974).
55. 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
56. 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
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Vice President Agnew and attend loud military band recitals. 7 On these
facts, the Fourth Circuit inferred discrimination and shifted the burden
to the government to rebut the inference of selective prosecution.18 It
stated, "It is neither novel nor unfair to require the party in possession of
the facts to disclose them."5 9 After government disclosure, the court
concluded that the defendants had been selectively prosecuted.
Later that same year, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v.
Steele." In Steele, census-resisters who actively promoted the resistence
movement were prosecuted for failing to complete their census forms.
Only four individuals were prosecuted and all had encouraged resistance
publicly, through press conferences or protest marches.
61
Steele attempted to show that his selection was deliberately based on
an "unjustifiable standard"; he relied on one of the first selective prosecu-
tion cases to set a standard, Oyler v. Boles.62 Oyler held that selection for
prosecution cannot be based on an "unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification., 63 Steele would be entitled to
an acquittal if evidence proved that the government "purposefully dis-
criminated against those who chose to exercise their first amendment
rights." 64 Some earlier cases had interpreted "purposeful" or "inten-
tional" in a way suggestive of bad faith.6 The Steele case is important
57. Id. at 1077. The defendants were also charged with creating a disturbance by con-
ducting several "Masses for Peace." The defendants included the clerics Bishop Crowthers
and Father Pierce who administered the religious services. Id. at 1076.
58. The court declared:
[W]e think when the record strongly suggests invidious discrimination and selective
application of a regulation to inhibit the expression of an unpopular viewpoint, and
where it appears that the government is in ready possession of the facts, and the
defendants are not, it is not unreasonable to reverse the burden of proof and to re-
quire the government to come forward with evidence as to what extent loud and




60. 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972). It should be noted that the Steele opinion was written
by Judge Eugene A. Wright, who also wrote the circuit court majority opinion in Wayte.
61. Id. at 1150-51.
62. 368 U.S. 448 (1962). In Oyler a prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition after being
convicted under a state recidivist statute. He argued that 904 other prisoners had not received
penalties as severe as his. See infra note 65.
63. 368 U.S. at 456.
64. 461 F.2d at 1151 (emphasis added).
65. The two sources for the "purposeful" interpretation were Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448
(1962) and Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); both had language limiting the availability
of the claim of selective prosecution.
The Oyler court determined that while a habitual criminal statute had been applied un-
equally, the defendant's allegations set out no more than a failure to prosecute others because
the prosecutors lacked knowledge of other defendants' prior offenses. 368 U.S. at 456.
Although only a minority of prior offenders were prosecuted under the statute, their selection
was not "the result of a deliberate policy of proceeding only in a certain class of cases or
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because it stresses the systematic impermissible standard approach. 6
Steele was able to demonstrate that at least six others had failed to
fill out their census forms, but had not been prosecuted. None had taken
a public stand on census resistance. When confronted with this evidence,
the United States Attorney's Office indicated initially that information
about the identity of those who failed to complete census forms was un-
available.67 The Regional Technician for the census testified that he had
never heard of the six. 68 However, the government clearly had all the
names of those who failed to fill out the form completely-it only had to
look at the forms.
Subsequent evidence indicated that government officials had been
very concerned about the census resistance movement and in fact had
compiled background dossiers on the vocal resisters.69 The court deter-
mined that the mere fact that the government should have had all the
names through the system alone "strongly suggest[ed] a questionable em-
phasis upon the [vocal] census resisters. ' 70 The government offered no
against specific persons." Id. The Court concluded that the selection for prosecution was not
based on "an unjustifiable standard, such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification." Id.
The Oyler court cited Snowden for support; Snowden used the "intentional" or "pur-
poseful" standard in a way implying bad faith. 321 U.S. at 8. However, this support was
misplaced. Snowden was a civil action in which the plaintiff charged that two election board
members refused to certify him as a nominee for impermissible reasons. Id. at 4. Therefore, it
was more appropriate to require a showing of some sort of ill will. It is also revealing to note
that even Snowden recognized that "purposeful" discrimination may be evidenced by system-
atic discrimination. Id. at 9.
The Oyler case is best known for its chilling dicta that the conscious exercise of some
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a constitutional violation. 368 U.S. at 456. Although
the United States was not a party in the case, it has doubtless benefitted from this powerful and
often criticized statement. See, e.g., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 619 (7th Cir. 1973).
66. It has been argued that the Snowden interpretation (discussed supra note 65) is more
appropriate in cases involving a lone plaintiff or defendant, rather than when the selective
prosecution is systematic, or is of an identifiable class (such as classifications based on race or
religion). Note, United States v. Falk: Developments in the Defense of Discriminatory Prosecu-
tion, 72 MICH. L. Rlv. 1113, 1119 (1974). "Where the existence of an impermissible standard
can be shown by objective criteria, there should be no need to prove that the standard was
applied with malice." Id.
Under this analysis, the passive enforcement system used in Wayte to select exclusively
vocal offenders for prosecution would constitute objective criteria of impermissible selection
based solely on the exercise of First Amendment rights. Evidence that the government had a
"good" motive for selecting vocal violators, such as bolstering the national security, would not
remedy the constitutional infirmity of the selection procedure. The Supreme Court is aware of
the objective/subjective distinction as evidenced by its reference to the "necessity of showing
systematic or intentional discrimination." Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 359 (1973)
(dictum) (emphasis added); see also Snowden, 321 U.S. at 8-9.
67. 461 F.2d at 1151.
68. Id. at 1151-52.
69. Id. at 1151.
70. Id. at 1152.
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explanation or justification for its actions other than prosecutorial
discretion.
The court concluded that Steele had been selected for prosecution
on the basis of his exercise of First Amendment rights. It stated, "An
enforcement procedure that focuses upon the vocal offender is inherently
suspect, since it is vulnerable to the charge that those chosen for prosecu-
tion are being punished for their expression of ideas, a Constitutionally
protected right."71
The next, and perhaps most important case with respect to Wayte is
United States v. Falk.7 2 The facts in Falk are similar to those in Wayte.
Falk was a vocal antidraft activist who participated in draft-resisters or-
ganizations and protested American actions in Vietnam. Falk was in-
dicted on four counts, including refusal to submit for induction and
failure to have a draft card.73 Over 25,000 Selective Service registrants
also failed to possess their draft cards. Although the government was
aware of the violations, other violators were not being prosecuted.
The Seventh Circuit looked to Steele and Crowthers for guidance,
and saw in Steele "[s]imilar circumstances, in which a vocal dissenter
appeared to have been singled out for prosecution."'74 In addition, the
list of officials involved in approving the decision to prosecute Falk was
suspicious. The court found it "difficult to believe that the usual course
of proceedings in a draft case requires such careful consideration by such
a distinguished succession of officials prior to a formal decision to
prosecute.
' 75
The Falk trial court had rejected the claim of selective prosecution,
and a Seventh Circuit panel had affirmed.76 However, on rehearing en
banc, the court reversed in a four to three decision. The dissenting judge
on the panel now wrote for the majority:77 "[J]ust as discrimination on
the basis of religion or race is forbidden by the Constitution, so is dis-
crimination on the basis of the exercise of protected First Amendment
activities, whether done as an individual or, as in this case, as a member
of a group unpopular with the government. ' 78 The majority applied the
Steele holding that an enforcement procedure that focuses upon the vocal
offender is inherently suspect and found (1) that Falk had established a
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane).
73. Id. at 617-18.
74. Id. at 621.
75. Id. at 622. As noted in Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1383, the list of officials who approved
Falk's prosecution included the Assistant United States Attorney, the Chief of the Criminal
Division of the United States Attorney's Office, the First Assistant United States Attorney, the
United States Attorney, and officials with the Department of Justice in Washington.
76. 472 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 479 F.2d 616 (en banc).
77. Judge Sprecher wrote for the majority in Falk.
78. 479 F.2d at 620.
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prima facie case; 9 and (2) that it was incumbent upon the government
to come forward with evidence rebutting the inferential evidence.8 0 The
Falk court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing and thus al-
lowed Falk to question the Assistant United States Attorney, engage in
discovery, and present additional evidence that the government had not
prosecuted other violators.8 1
Falk's treatment of the evidentiary hearing question is important. A
request for an evidentiary hearing in selective prosecution cases usually
arises when the defendant moves to dismiss the indictment against him
on selective prosecution grounds. A hearing is granted when the defend-
ant proffers evidence probative of the issue of selective prosecution. 2
The Falk court established that if a defendant could raise a "reason-
able doubt" that he was selectively prosecuted, then he should be granted
an evidentiary hearing on that issue.8 3 The court also implied that upon
the "reasonable doubt" showing, the burden of going forward would
shift to the government to prove nondiscrimination. 4
The Falk dissent criticized this result and argued that the "reason-
able doubt" standard opened the floodgates for evidentiary hearings that
pry into the motives of prosecutors.8 The dissent worried that Falk
79. Id. at 623. For a description of the prima facie case, see supra text accompanying note
52 and infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
80. 479 F.2d at 624. To meet its burden, the government had to show "compelling evi-
dence." Id.
81. Id. at 623-24.
82. The amount of evidence required may vary. Compare Falk, 479 F.2d at 620-21 (facts
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the prosecutor's purpose) with United States v.
Erne, 576 F.2d 212, 216 (9th Cir. 1976) (enough facts alleged to take the question past the
frivolous stage), and United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1983) (prelimi-
nary showing that there is a legitimate issue concerning the government conduct).
83. 479 F.2d at 624.
84. Recent Decisions, 62 ILL. B.J. 472-74 (1974) (suggesting that the Seventh Circuit in-
tended the burden to shift without establishment of the prima facie case, on the raising of
reasonable doubt alone).
85. The Falk dissenters argued that Falk had "failed to show that a line had been drawn"
between those who exercised their First Amendment rights and those who did not. 479 F.2d
at 626 & n.2 (Cummings, Hastings, & Pell, J.J., dissenting). The dissent also quoted the panel
opinion which reasoned that "select enforcement of a law against someone in a position to
influence others is unquestionably a legitimate prosecutorial scheme to secure general compli-
ance with the law." 472 F.2d at 1108 (panel opinion).
This reasoning is appropriate when the defendant gains his position of influence through
general notoriety. For example, it is constitutionally acceptable to punish an organized crime
figure for tax evasion when the figure's prominence and influence on the public stems from
reputation in the community. However, this rationale is unacceptable when the government
exclusively and selectively prosecutes offenders who gain prominence through their exercise of
constitutionally protected rights. See Note, supra note 66, at 1128.
Moreover, even the Falk dissenters suggested that the decision would have been tolerable
if Falk had established that the effect of the government's prosecutive policy was to prosecute
only those who vocally opposed government policy. 479 F.2d at 627. Thus, Wayte established
what even the Falk dissenters would have regarded as a case of impermissible selective prose-
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could be used to investigate and curb a prosecutor's every discretion.
While this concern is certainly valid, the real impact of the standard de-
pends upon how a particular court defines "reasonable doubt." Requir-
ing a strong showing to raise a reasonable doubt may still effectively
insulate prosecutorial discretion; however, Falk permits greater scrutiny
of executive agencies and officials in determinations of prosecutive policy
than previous cases. While Falk may not be widely used for this purpose,
it may well be the only available deterrent to prosecutorial
discrimination.
8 6
It seems that the Falk majority had just this deterrent effect in mind;
it strongly disapproved the use of Oyler dicta to validate all methods of
enforcement and shield procedures and decisionmakers from judicial
scrutiny. Quoting Judge Cummings, it declared that "[t]he judiciary has
always borne the basic responsibility for protecting individuals against
unconstitutional invasions of their rights by all branches of govern-
ment."8" The minority's reliance on separation of powers as a reason for
looking the other way was thus unconvincing. As one commentator
notes, "If separation of powers prevents review of discretion of executive
officers, then more than a hundred Supreme Court decisions spread over
a century and three-quarters will have to be found contrary to the
Constitution." 8
The final case setting the stage is United States v. Scott.8 9 Scott was
convicted for failure to file an income tax return, and claimed selective
prosecution on the basis of his exercise of First Amendment rights as a
vocal opponent of the system. Scott failed to establish a prima facie case
because he failed to satisfy the first prong of the test; he did not show that
other violators, who were silent, were not prosecuted. The court distin-
guished Scott from Steele in which the government had knowledge and
proof of other violators, but had prosecuted only those violators who had
taken a public stand against compliance with the census law. The Scott
court clarified that the government could properly prosecute vocal viola-
tors, as long as nonvocal violators were also being prosecuted. 90 Scott
cution: that the effect of the government's prosecutive policy was to prosecute only nonregis-
trants who vocally opposed the draft. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
86. Comment, supra note 54, at 67. The concurring opinion in Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 624
(1973) (Fairchild, J., concurring), suggests that judicial inquiry into the motives of the govern-
ment prosecution was not only warranted, but necessary to the fair and equal administration of
the law under the Constitution. "This is indeed an exceptional area of national life where
conscientious opposition to government policy has been intertwined with violations of the laws
which implement the policy." Id. at 625.
87. 479 F.2d at 624 (quoting Stamler v. Willis, 415 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970)).
88. K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JUsTIcE 210 (1969).
89. 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1975).
90. Scott has been consistently followed. See, e.g., United States v. Oaks, 527 F.2d 937,
940 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976) (prosecution permissible because no
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presented no evidence that the government failed to prosecute nonvocal
violators, and therefore Scott was not impermissibly singled out.91
Tax cases like Scott 92 form a line of precedent inapplicable to polit-
ical First Amendment cases, such as Falk or Steele. The government
prosecutes tax offenders continuously, and while it doubtless believes
that prosecuting vocal tax protesters has a beneficial deterrent effect, it
has no policy or practice of prosecuting only vocal tax offenders. 93 Since
no implicit or explicit enforcement procedure focuses solely on vocal tax
offenders, a vocal tax offender claiming selective prosecution must make
a more particularized showing of impermissible motive or ground for se-
lection. He will have to show that the government focused its investiga-
tion on him.94
In contrast, the evidence presented to the district court in Wayte
proved that the government had implemented an enforcement procedure
which both in policy and practice selected only vocal offenders. The con-
stitutional concern is greater when the selection is systemic than when a
single individual defendant is targeted for investigation and
prosecution.
95
B. The Prima Facie Case
A defendant claiming selective prosecution must satisfy a two-prong
test for establishing a prima facie case. The defendant must show: (1)
that others similarly situated have not been prosecuted; and (2) that his
selection was based on an impermissible ground such as race, religion, or
his exercise of First Amendment rights to free speech.96 The first prong
evidence presented that government did not prosecute nonvocal tax offenders); United States v.
Stout, 601 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979) (prosecution of a vocal
violator permissible so long as other nonvocal violators were prosecuted as well).
91. 521 F.2d at 1195.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ness,
652 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1981).
93. See Scott, 521 F.2d at 1195 (no evidence that government fails to prosecute those who
fail to file tax returns but do not take a vocal stand on the issue). Presumably, government tax
audits based on random selection warn the average citizen that he, too, will be prosecuted for
tax offenses. Investigating and prosecuting both vocal and nonvocal tax offenders is not only a
sound constitutional scheme based on random selection, it is also an effective tool for securing
general compliance with the law. It is more than puzzling that the government did not adopt
such a scheme for enforcing draft registration.
94. See infra text accompanying note 142.
95. Brief for the Appellee at 17, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
96. United States v. Oaks, 527 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing United States v. Scott,
521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1975)). See United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir.
1981). In Wilson the court compared United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir.),
cerL denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978) to United States v. Choate, 619 F.2d 21, 23 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980). The Gillings court stated that the Ninth Circuit uses the prima
facie test of United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (prosecution based on
the exercise of constitutional rights is an impermissible ground). The Choate court stated that
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of the test must often be satisfied by statistical data.97 While it is sug-
gested that statistical data is sometimes equivocal,9" it is often the only
means available to a defendant to establish nonprosecution of other of-
fenders. 99 The second prong is satisfied by direct or statistical evidence.
In early selective prosecution cases, defendants had to show that their
prosecution was based on an unjustifiable standard that relied on an "ar-
bitrary classification. ''" °" This concept was broadened to include not
only the exercise of First Amendment rights as an impermissible ground
for selection for prosecution, but the exercise of any constitutional right
as well.
01
Once a prima facie case establishes that a law or its application re-
sults in a discriminatory effect, the court will review it under one of three
standards to determine if an individual is being denied equal protection
of the law. 102
C. Equal Protection Standards of Review
The traditional standard is the low level of scrutiny used to uphold
economic and social regulations as long as they are rationally related to a
constitutionally permissible government interest." 3 Laws are presump-
tively constitutional, just as criminal prosecutions are presumptively un-
the Ninth Circuit had expanded Oyler to include the exercise of First Amendment rights.
Wilson expressly approved Gillings and held that a prosecution based on the exercise of consti-
tutional rights is impermissible. 639 F.2d at 504. The recent Ninth Circuit case of United
States v. Christopher, 700 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 461 U.S. 960 (1983) prohibits
prosecution "based upon impermissible grounds." Id. at 1258.
97. See infra note 99.
98. While statistical data supports an inference of selective prosecution, courts have indi-
cated two reasons why statistical data may be inadequate in some situations: (1) data showing
that similarly situated people have not been prosecuted may mean only that enforcement of the
law has been lax; and (2) the failure to prosecute others may reflect only the prosecutor's lack
of knowledge that other similarly situated violators exist, so that any resulting selective prose-
cution would be unintentional. Comment, supra note 54, at 65. See generally supra notes 58-
64 and accompanying text.
99. Statistical data is not only important in establishing a defendant's prima facie case of
selective prosecution, but also in satisfying the standard for an evidentiary hearing on the
matter. It may be the decisive factor in granting the defendant power to subpoena documents
probative of the elements of the defense of selective prosecution. See Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1211-
12. See also United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1973) (defendant must show
a colorable basis of selective prosecution to be entitled to subpoena documentary evidence
required to establish the defense). For a discussion of the importance of statistical data in
Falk, see Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 179 & n.2.
100. Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456.
101. See supra note 96.
102. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 45, at 1000-97.
103. See, eg., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Lindsley v. Nat'l Carbonic Gas Co. 220
U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
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dertaken in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory fashion."°
The middle standard provides an intermediate level of scrutiny for
quasi-suspect classifications, such as gender-based differentiations.
10 5
The offending classification or law must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.
10 6
The third standard is that of strict scrutiny. It requires an inversion
of the normal presumption of constitutionality and demands that the
government justify the classification or procedure as necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest. Also, there must be no less burdensome al-
ternative available to accomplish the government's interest. The strict
scrutiny level of review is triggered when a classification "trammels fun-
damental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions
such as race, religion, or alienage."' 0 7 Laws that interfere with the exer-
cise of fundamental rights and liberties "explicitly or implicitly guaran-
teed by the Constitution"'1 8 will be subject to strict scrutiny, and as one
scholar notes, "in none of the cases in which the Court has found that a
law invaded a fundamental right has it held that the legislation was justi-
fied by a compelling state interest." 10 9
III. The Two Court Decisions
A. The Trial Court
1. The Prima Facie Case
The district court laid out the two-prong prima facie case for selec-
tive prosecution as follows:
The defendant must show: (1) that others similarly situated have
not been prosecuted for conduct similar to that for which the de-
fendant was prosecuted; and (2) that the government's discrimina-
tory selection of the defendant for prosecution was based on
impermissible grounds such as race, religion or exercise of the de-
fendant's First Amendment right of free speech."o
The authorities cited in support of this framing were United States v.
Scott' I and United States v. Berrios."
2
104. Falk, 479 F.2d at 620.
105. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
106. Id.
107. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
108. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1972) (education
not a fundamental right because neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion). But see Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (edu-
cation considered a fundamental interest under the California Constitution).
109. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 374 (1979).
110. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1380.
111. 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1975); see supra notes 89-95 and
accompanying text.
112. 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974); see supra note 96.
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The court found that Wayte had satisfied the first prong, since well
over 500,000 men had also failed to register for the draft in violation of
the Selective Service Act, and had not been prosecuted. The two
problems commonly associated with an inference from statistical data
were not at issue here; the 500,000 figure was not caused by inadvertant
lax enforcement or the government's lack of knowledge that other viola-
tors existed." 13
The question left for the court was whether the evidence showed
that Wayte's prosecution was based on the impermissible ground of exer-
cise of the defendant's First Amendment rights." 4 Did the passive sys-
tem operate so that only vocal nonregistrants would be selected for
prosecution?
The district court concluded that the government's passive enforce-
ment system led only to indictments of vocal nonregistrants; it was there-
fore constitutionally infirm. 115 Further, the government was completely
cognizant of the selective effect of the passive enforcement policy." 6 It
also recognized that "the passive program had potentially serious first
amendment problems that would lead to selective prosecution claims,"" 7
and knew that an "active" system would remedy the defect." 8 Finally,
and most importantly, although the government had the means to imple-
ment the active system through its own agencies, it did not. Instead, it
implemented the passive enforcement system, and "must now accept the
consequences of that choice.""' 9 "[A]s Steele and Falk make clear, this
[prosecutive] policy violates the first amendment rights of the vocal non-
registrants by selecting them, alone, for prosecution."'
120
Implicit in its decision is the district court's application of the strict
scrutiny standard of review. The government action interfered with the
exercise of a constitutional right, thereby qualifying for the strict scrutiny
113. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
114. The district court assumed that Wayte's letter-writing was an exercise of his First
Amendment right to free speech. The court simply stated that Wayte was singled out for
prosecution because "he exercised his first amendment right to free speech." 549 F. Supp. at
1382. The circuit court opinion did not discuss whether Wayte had exercised his First
Amendment right to free speech. Rather, it focused on the lack of impermissible motivation
by the government. 710 F.2d at 1387-88. While this Comment was at the printer, the
Supreme Court held that Wayte's First Amendment rights were not violated by the govern-
ment procedure. United States v. Wayte, 53 U.S.L.W. 4319 (March 19, 1985). See supra note
7.
115. 549 F. Supp. at 1384-85. Accord United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046, 1049
(6th Cir. 1983); contra United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287, 1292 (8th Cir. 1984). For
discussion of the Schmucker and Eklund cases, see infra note 168.
116. 549 F. Supp. at 1385; see supra text accompanying notes 27-42.
117. 549 F. Supp. at 1384; see supra text accompanying notes 27-42.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 27-42.
119. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1384.
120. Id.
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standard. In addition, the Steele and Falk cases had established that
prosecution of only vocal violators was inherently suspect. 121 The pas-
sive enforcement system was therefore subject to the reverse presumption
of constitutionality, and the burden was on the government to prove that
the passive enforcement system was necessary to achieve a compelling
government interest and that no other means of enforcement was avail-
able to accomplish the governmental interest. The court found that an
alternate means was readily available to the government in either an ac-
tive system, or an active and passive system together.122 The district
court rejected the government's arguments that the passive enforcement
system was necessary to achieve government interests because of a lack
of alternative enforcement systems, cost, and deterrence
considerations. 123
2. The Evidentiary Hearing
The district court held that Wayte was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on his claim of selective prosecution. The holding was based on
the set of facts alleged by Wayte at a pretrial hearing on the issue. The
standard required by United States v. Erne, 24 a Ninth Circuit case, was
that the defendant must allege enough facts to take the question of selec-
tive prosecution past the frivolous stage.
125
Wayte clearly met this standard through the allegation of three
facts: (1) that nonregistrants totalled over 500,000 men; (2) that a pas-
sive enforcement system existed; and (3) that the system resulted in the
indictments of twelve men, including Wayte, all of whom were vocal
nonregistrants. 
126
In effect, Wayte's factual allegations raised a "reasonable doubt"
under Falk that improper prosecutorial motives existed. The circum-
121. Falk, 479 F.2d at 621; Steele, 461 F.2d at 1152.
122. The court finds it hard to believe that the prosecutive arm of the Government,
with access to Social Security records, could not locate any non-registrants other
than those who were vocal in their opposition to draft registration. In fact, the Gov-
ernment concedes that if and when an active enforcement program is implemented, it
has the ability to select men to prosecute based on randomness.
Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1381.
123. Id. at 1384.
124. 576 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1978).
125. Id. at 216. In United States v. Oaks, 508 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1974), afl'd after re-
mand, 527 F.2d 937 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 452 (1976), a tax offender argued under the
Steele case that he had alleged facts sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
selective prosecution. 508 F.2d at 1404. The Oaks court observed that hearings on similar
pretrial motions are granted when a defendant alleges enough facts to take the question past
the frivolous stage, and reasoned that since Oaks had met this standard he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. Id. The Oaks standard was adopted in Erne, 576 F.2d at 216.
For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit standard for granting an evidentiary hearing, see
supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
126. See generally supra notes 11-29 and accompanying text.
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stances in Wayte raised just the problem in prosecutorial discretion that
Falk had anticipated. 12 7 Under either the Erne or Falk standard, the
district court ruling was correct.
B. The Circuit Court
1. The Prima Facie Case
The circuit court laid out the following two-prong prima facie case
for selective prosecution: the defendant must show (1) that others simi-
larly situated have not been prosecuted; and (2) that the prosecution is
based on an impermissible motive.128 The cited authority for this fram-
ing was United States v. Ness,129 a tax offender case. The second prong is
notably different from that used by the district court, which was "based
on impermissible grounds such as. . .exercise of the defendant's right
of free speech." 13 The difference is noteworthy because it gives the sec-
ond prong a different aura-one that implies that bad faith must be pres-
ent and demonstrated. Some early case law had emphasized a showing
of this kind,"'1 and tax cases such as Ness require this more individual-
specific approach. 132 In political First Amendment cases, however, the
trend has been to consider a showing of objective circumstances, as evi-
denced by the change in the language of the second prong.
Ness, like Scott,13 3 is a tax case. As has been noted,134 a vocal tax
offender cannot successfully claim prosecution as a result of a systematic
selection system; he must show a more particularized, individual-specific
intent by the government to select him for prosecution. The circuit
court's use of the Ness framing should not change the legal meaning of
the test-an "impermissible motive" under Ness would be selection for
prosecution on the basis of the exercise of Wayte's right of free speech
under Scott and Berrios.
1 35
The circuit court held that Wayte had satisfied the first prong of the
test, for the same reasons given by the district court.1 36 There was sim-
ply no way around the fact that many similarly situated men had not
been prosecuted.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
128. Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1380.
129. 652 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981). In United States v.
Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), the Eighth Circuit also relied on a tax case.
See infra note 168.
130. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1380.
131. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
133. For a discussion of the Scott case, see supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 89-95.
135. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text; see also supra note 96.
136. Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1385.
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The court concluded that Wayte failed to establish a prima facie
case, however, because he did not show "that he was selected from the
larger group because of the exercise of his Constitutional rights." '137 The
use of "because" is critical-it reveals that the circuit court focused on
"motive" in an individualized way, instead of focusing on the systematic
procedure itself. The phrase "based on" used by the district court 138 to
mean "on the basis of" '39 was not used because it could be interpreted to
mean "through"-and Wayte was clearly selected for prosecution
through the exercise of his First Amendment rights. "Because" indicates
that the prosecutorial motive must be individual-specific.
The circuit court continued: "The government may not purpose-
fully discriminate against persons who exercise their First Amendment
rights [citation omitted]. Wayte contends that the government was
aware that its passive enforcement system would result in the prosecu-
tion of vocal non-registrants only.""
The court's use of "purposefully" seems to mean "individually" in
the sense that the government may not go out of its way to prosecute
certain individuals. This interpretation is clear from the use of the word
"persons" instead of the less specific term "those." "Those" could indi-
cate a class, as well as different individuals. The use of "those" makes
the procedure vulnerable since it certainly selected "those who exercised
their First Amendment rights."
The implication in the second statement is that the government may
not have been aware that its procedure was "designed to insure that only
persons who are most adamant . . . will be prosecuted.""14 The court
seems to imply that the government may not "purposefully" hunt down
individual vocal nonregistrants, but it may institute a procedure that "ac-
cidentally", selects them.
The Ninth Circuit finally revealed its hand: "The evidence
presented by Wayte does not demonstrate impermissible motiva-
tion. . . . Wayte made no showing that the government focused its in-
vestigation on him because of his protest activities."1 42 The cited
authority is Ness.143 But Wayte, of course, never claimed that the gov-
ernment was motivated to prosecute him "individually." As a tax case,
Ness requires a showing of individual-specific motive as a practical mat-
137. Id. (emphasis added). Accord United States v. Eklund, 551 F. Supp. 964, 968 (S.D.
Iowa 1982), affd, 733 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1984).
138. See supra text accompanying note 110.
139. The Falk court also uses these phrases interchangeably. See supra text accompanying
note 78.
140. Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1387.
141. Jensen Memo, supra note 20; see supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
142. Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1387 (emphasis added).
143. 652 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1981).
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ter.1" Individual-specific "motivation" was never an issue in this case.
145
The circuit court destroyed the distinction between systematic dis-
crimination and individual-specific discrimination that the district court
made explicit. In the process of comparing Falk to the facts of Wayte,
the district court stated:
The Falk court was concerned with selective prosecution as it fo-
cused on one individual. The court emphasized that the officials
mentioned had approved Falk's indictment. The circumstances in
this case are different from Falk. The constitutional infirmity is the
Government's passive enforcement system itself It is important to
emphasize that no party in this case, nor this court, has ever sug-
gested that the White House (through Mr. Meese or any staff) or
the Task Force were involved in the decision to prosecute this par-
ticular defendant. 
146
"Motive" was, therefore, not the issue before the court. It would
have been if the selection process were designed to be random, but some-
how only vocal nonregistrants were prosecuted. The passive enforce-
ment system itself, and its calculated yield, were the real issues before the
court.
Once it rejected Wayte's prima facie case, the circuit court needed to
legitimize the government's passive enforcement system. Two explana-
tions were offered by the government and accepted by the court.147 The
first was that the government did not know the names of other violators.
This is question-begging at its worst. The government by its own admis-
sion had access to the names of all violators through Social Security
files. 148 Moreover, defense evidence demonstrated that lists of eighteen,
nineteen, twenty, and twenty-one year-old men were available through
state motor vehicle registration offices.149 As the district court observed,
nonvocal nonregistrants could be identified easily by comparing those
lists to the government's list of men who registered. 150 If the government
did not know who the other violators were, it was simply because it was
144. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95 and 133-35.
145. The use of Ness was even more questionable because the Ninth Circuit had just re-
cently reaffirmed the use of the more objective language of "impermissible grounds" in the
second prong. United States v. Christopher, 700 F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 960 (1983) (citing United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1981)). The court
elaborated: "The impermissible selection must be shown to be based on an unjustifiable stan-
dard such as the exercise of the first amendment right of free speech." 700 F.2d at 1258.
Christopher, unlike Ness, was not a tax case.
146. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1383-84 (emphasis added).
147. If the circuit court truly had been concerned with "motive" in the Wayte case, it need
only have considered evidence that indicated the government targeted only vocal nonregis-
trants for prosecution. See supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text. See, e.g., infra note 172.
148. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
149. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1381 n.6.
150. Id.
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not interested in looking for them.1 51
The second explanation offered by the government was that only
vocal nonregistrants were prosecuted because their statements were nec-
essary to establish a willful violation of the law.1 52 While certainly an
ingenious twist, it is hardly satisfactory reasoning. United States v. Tay-
lor, 53 which is cited authority for this notion, is inapposite. In Taylor,
the defendants were prosecuted for participating in an illegal strike.
Since absence from work was an equivocal act which could have had a
completely innocent and independent explanation (such as illness), the
defendants' vocal participation was necessary to establish willfulness.
In Wayte, however, the element of willfulness required under section
462(a) of the United States Code was established when Wayte did not
respond to letters sent by certified mail from the Selective Service and the
United States Attorney for Wayte's district. These letters apprised
Wayte of his duty to register and warned him of penalties. 54 Moreover,
the government admitted that the Federal Bureau of Investigation con-
ducted an interview with Wayte, during which Wayte "acknowledged
receipt of letters requesting him to register." '55 As the dissent in the
circuit court opinion points out, there was no need to rely on his First
Amendment activities to establish willfulness.1 56 Such reliance strongly
151. As the district court observed:
[T]he court cannot accept the Government's disingenious argument that it has prose-
cuted all known non-registrants. It strains credulity to believe that the investigative
agencies of our Government, especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation, could
not locate any non-vocal non-registrants [footnote omitted]. The inference is strong
that the Government could have located non-vocal non-registrants, but chose not to.
549 F. Supp. at 1381. The court then noted that nonregistrants could be located in many
states by using motor vehicle registration records. Id.
152. The government characterized the letters as "confessions." Brief for the United States
at 27, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983). See infra note 156.
153. 693 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1982).
154. See supra notes 14-16.
155. Brief for the United States at 8, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
156. 710 F.2d 1385, 1390 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Apparently, the government does not
characterize Wayte's letters as a "simpl[e] . . . exercise of the right to petition the government
to protest perceived wrongs or to persuade it to abandon policies deemed unwise or unjust."
Brief for the United States at 27, Wayte, 719 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983). "They were unequivo-
cal confessions to the commission of a crime .... " Id. The government declared that it is
"perfectly proper to select for prosecution persons who have facilitated such proceedings by
uttering statements demonstrating that their transgressions of the law are willful or inten-
tional," and that "the First Amendment provides no protection against prosecution where the
statement 'is the very vehicle of the crime itself'." Id.
The government's insistence that Wayte's letters were the "vehicle of his crime" and un-
protected under the First Amendment is difficult to understand. As the defense pointed out,
"[tihe crime involved here, if any, is willful non-registration, not willful statements in opposi-
tion to draft registration. The act of non-registration is analytically separate from statements
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suggests the punitive nature of the selection process.1
57
The two reasons offered by the government and accepted by the cir-
cuit court to legitimize the passive enforcement system are therefore at
best disingenious, and at worst, embarrassing concoctions. The basis of
the court's analysis remains unclear; the court apparently rejected the
Steele and Falk standard that prosecution of vocal violators is inherently
suspect. It is arguable that the court used a rational basis test and found
these two reasons persuasive.
However, a court of appeals may not reverse a district court decision
merely because it would have found otherwise. The court must affirm
unless the district court's findings are "clearly erroneous" as a matter of
law. 58 Since the district court found ample evidence of selective prose-
cution, the circuit court-notwithstanding its reservations-should have
affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit chose to reverse. It baldly stated that because
Wayte had presented no evidence of selective prosecution, the district
court finding of selective prosecution was clearly erroneous. 159 The cir-
cuit court's "blanket rejection"' 6" of the district court's factual findings
violates both the spirit, and letter, of the law. It is thus that the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals stands naked.
announcing or explaining it." Brief for the Appellee at 16 n.10, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th
Cir. 1983).
But perhaps the government's statements reveal its belief that the act of making such
statements are somehow criminal in nature. Id. The prosecution stated unequivocally, "the
record shows that appellee was prosecuted because he directed letters to the Selective Service
System. . . ." Brief for the United States at 25, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983). The
government also (1) referred to the content of the letters as confessions and (2) posited that
Wayte was prosecuted for not responding to the government's warning letters. Id. But send-
ing a letter of protest-or even of confession--does not violate the draft registration law. Nor
is refusing to respond to government inducements to register a violation of that law. Thus,
Wayte was prosecuted "because he directed letters to the Selective Service System"; his selec-
tion was based impermissibly on this exercise of First Amendment rights.
157. See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text. The government argued that it prose-
cuted only those who refused to register after attempts to induce them to so do failed. Brief for
the United States at 21, Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983). This argument does not address
the problem in thefirst step of selection. The government sent letters of inducement only to
the targeted class of vocal nonregistrants. The government had already chosen them for prose-
cution through the "Suspected Violator Inventory System." See supra text accompanying note
22. To argue that vocal nonregistrants such as Wayte were "chosen" for prosecution because
they did not heed government warnings merely evades the problem of the initial impermissible
selectivity.
158. Wilson, 639 F.2d at 503 & n.2. This standard of review insures the integrity of the
trial court's factfinding process.
159. Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1388.
160. "The Wayte court's blanket rejection of the trial court's factual findings of selective
prosecution does not impress us." United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir.
1983).
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2. The Evidentiary Hearing
The circuit court held that "because Wayte made no initial showing
of selective prosecution, he was not entitled to discovery of government
documents."16' The court's meaning is unclear. If by "initial showing"
the court meant establishing a prima facie case, it applied an incorrect
test. 162 If the court meant that Wayte had failed to allege facts to take
the question past the frivolous stage under Erne,163 or raise a reasonable
doubt under Falk,164 then one can only question what more convincing
facts165 could have been added to meet the test for a mere evidentiary
hearing, 166 but fail to establish a prima facie case.
3. The Dissent
Circuit Judge Schroeder skillfully revealed that the emperors wear
no clothes. She found the government interests cited by the majority
inadequate to justify a policy and procedure "designed to punish only
those who had communicated their violation of the law to others."' 67
Her short and cogent analysis focused on Steele and Falk and found se-
lective prosecution; it rejected as implausible the two reasons offered as
justification for the passive enforcement system and distinguished Tay-
lor; it affirmed the "clearly erroneous" standard for review of district
court findings and concluded that the district court findings were
sound.1 6 8
161. 710 F.2d at 1388. The government defied a district court order instructing it to turn
over specified documents that were to be the basis of Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese's
testimony. 549 F. Supp. at 1378. The documents were not disclosed and Meese did not testify
because the government claimed executive privilege. Id. at 1383. The district court declared,
"Since the Government had the burden of rebutting the prima facie case of selective prosecu-
tion, its refusal to comply with this court's orders reflects a curious strategy. It also raises
serious questions as to whether the Government has pursued this case in good faith." Id.
162. "To be granted an evidentiary hearing, the defendant must allege enough facts to take
the question beyond the frivolous stage." 549 F. Supp. at 1379 (citing United States v. Erne,
576 F.2d 212, 216 (9th Cir. 1978)). See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 124-25, 162 and accompanying text.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
165. See supra text accompanying note 126.
166. There is a split in the two circuits that have dealt with the evidentiary hearing ques-
tion following Wayte. The Sixth Circuit in Schmucker found that the defendant was entitled
to an evidentiary hearing because he made a preliminary showing that there was a legitimate
issue concerning the government's conduct. 721 F.2d at 1049. The Eighth Circuit in Eklund
found that the defendant had not made a showing sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to
the government's purpose in prosecuting him. 733 F.2d at 1291. See supra text accompanying
notes 85-86.
167. 710 F.2d at 1389.
168. Id. at 1389-90. Judge Schroeder's dissent has been cited as persuasive authority in one
of the other two circuits that have considered the constitutionality of the passive enforcement
system after Wayte. In United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth
Circuit reversed a district court ruling that Schmucker was not entitled to an evidentiary hear-
ing. The district court had determined that selective prosecution was not a valid defense. The
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Conclusion
One cannot help but feel that the Ninth Circuit in Wayte was not
"straight with us." '169 What were the unstated reasons behind the deci-
sion? Perhaps one is the historical disinclination to interfere with Selec-
tive Service decisions.170  Or perhaps the court felt that the policy of
allowing selective prosecution claims (though few defendants were actu-
ally successful) was too broad and its availability should be restricted so
"the criminal won't go free." '171 Other reasons might be respect for
prosecutorial discretion, or fear that an affirmance of the district court's
Sixth Circuit disagreed: "The question before us then is whether a prosecutorial policy vio-
lates the first amendment if it is directed solely at 'the vocal non-registrant' who openly objects
to the law on religious, moral or political grounds. If so, the defendant is entitled to an eviden-
tiary hearing ... ." Id. at 1049. The court found that:
A prosecutorial policy so limited clearly violates the first amendment. It selects for
prosecution only those who speak out against the law. It selects people based on
their expression of beliefs and the strengths of their convictions. It excludes, and
therefore rewards, thousands who engage in covert noncompliance and evasion of the
law, including all who would confess their violation if sought out and interviewed. It
discourages dissenters from expressing their criticisms of government policy. Id.
The court determined that the government may not prosecute "only those who publicly
express their conscientious refusal to obey the registration law while leaving aside all who
engage in covert refusal to obey," id. at 1049, and cited the Falk case and the Wayte dissent in
support.
The Sixth Circuit decision dealt squarely with the government contention that the letters
were merely confessions proving willful nonregistration. See supra note 156. "The fact that
criticisms of governmental policy may be accompanied by or construed as confessions does not
make such criticisms any less an exercise of first amendment rights." Id. at 1051.
The protection that the Sixth Circuit accorded to expressions of dissent was flatly rejected
by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
Eklund and its companion case, United States v. Martin, 733 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1984) (en
banc), drew five to four decisions from an en banc court. Eklund relied on United States v.
Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978), a tax offender case, for the prima facie test and upheld
the district court determination that the "[d]efendant has not demonstrated that he is being
prosecuted because he has expressed his opposition to the draft registration law." 733 F.2d at
1290 (emphasis original). The majority also accepted the government's contentions that no
other enforcement procedure was available and that the protest letters were confessions. Id. at
1291-92. See supra note 156.
169. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
170. See generally Doernberg, Pass in Review: Due Process and Judicial Scrutiny of Classi-
fication Decisions of the Selective Service System, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1982).
171. The sentiment that the criminal should not go free because the constable blundered,
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.), has ample expres-
sion in the field of selective prosecution. It ranges from a policy perspective that our legal
system is founded on the rights of the innocent, 48 CoNN. B.J. 425, 425 (1974), to considera-
tion of procedural limitations on the availability of the defense in malum in se crimes. See
generally Comment, Curbing the Prosecutor's Discretion: United States v. Falk, 9 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 372, 374-75 n.17 (1974) (discussing Comment, The Right to Non-discriminatory
Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1103, 1106-12 (1961), which suggests
that the right to nondiscriminatory enforcement: (I) should not be violated in efforts to insure
that the criminal doesn't go free; (2) must protect the innocent and the guilty; and (3) exists
regardless of the type of crime charged).
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decision would flood the courts with selective prosecution cases dealing
with all sorts of state and federal procedures for review. It even may
have been respect for separation of powers that instilled a reluctance to
review decisions made by a string of high level executive government
officials on an important and far-reaching policy matter.
The circuit court opinion, however, does not cite such policy consid-
erations. Instead, it seems that the court realized that the government
had unwisely failed to insure a constitutional method of draft registration
enforcement, but felt that a failure to punish the offenders would make it
unlikely that anyone would register for the draft.172 The implicit premise
is that registration efforts are paramount to the constitutional rights of
draft resisters.173 The court apparently felt that the lesser of the two evils
was to uphold the prosecution. This premise poses a disturbing question
to the court. Were these vocal nonregistrants important: (1) merely be-
cause they had broken the law; (2) because they were the first few non-
registrants in the courts; or (3) because they had spoken out against the
draft? In this case, the second and third reasons are one and the same.
If they are, has not the court accepted and embraced the government's
implicit premise that it is acceptable and even desirable to prosecute
those who exercise their First Amendment rights in opposition to gov-
ernment policy and procedure as examples in the interest of general com-
pliance with the law?
This result demonstrates the kind of intuitive decisionmaking sug-
gested in the introduction of this Comment. Value laden premises of
equal protection decisions not only go unexplained, they are unmen-
172. Cf. United States v. Schmucker, 729 F.2d 1040, 1042 (6th Cir. 1984) (Wellford, J.,
dissenting). "The government's standard was found in Wayte to be a good faith assessment by
those charged with prosecution of registration law violators that acting in a timely fashion
against known violators to preserve the integrity of the [registration] law was deemed impor-
tant to the national defense." Id.
Perhaps the majority in Eklund revealed that it, too, gave "national security" priority
over the First Amendment. It noted at the outset that "at bottom this case arose because of
Eklund's failure to comply with the registration provisions implemented to protect the na-
tional security interests cited by President Carter." 733 F.2d at 1289. The court's statement
followed actual quotations from President Carter. The Eklund majority declared that, "[t]he
government would naturally be motivated to prosecute men who made public their violation of
the law. Because of the publicity given such violators, failure to do so would only encourage
others to violate the law." Id. at 1294. The court then observed that, absent bad faith, public-
ity is a proper consideration. The three cases cited for that notion are tax cases. As has been
previously discussed, courts have found that the government does not prosecute only vocal tax
offenders. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51 and notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
Deterrence is a proper consideration as long as both vocal and nonvocal offenders are prose-
cuted. Thus, the court failed to address the crucial issue: whether the government may prose-
cute only vocal nonregistrants.
173. The government proceeded with the passive enforcement system despite warnings that
it violated the constitutional rights of vocal nonregistrants. See supra notes 27-38 and accom-
panying text.
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tioned.171 If a court believes that it is acceptable to selectively prosecute
only those who speak out against government policy, then it should resist
the use of judicial legerdemain and boldly state that on balance the vital
and constitutional interests of individuals and groups of individuals are
overcome by the compelling governmental interest in compliance with
the draft law. Surely compliance with the law is in the interest of all,
including the government.
But it is also the responsibility of all, including the government.
For,
[n]othing can corrode respect for a rule of law more than the
knowledge that the government looks beyond the law itself to arbi-
trary considerations, such as race, religion, or control over the de-
fendant's exercise of his constitutional rights, as the basis for
determining its applicability. Selective prosecution then can be-
come a weapon used to discipline political foe and the dissident.
175
The narrow impact of the decision is clear.
176
But the wider impact will be on government rights and powers.
Fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution may one by one fall
by the wayside in the interest of order and compliance with the law, as
we are led by the government and the courts down a road paved with
good intentions.
174. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
175. United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1209 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing as examples
United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) and United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148
(9th Cir. 1972)).
176. "The effect of the majority's opinion is to permit the government to prosecute a citizen
because he has spoken out rather than because he has violated the law. The result weakens our
indispensible but fragile freedom to express unpopular ideas." Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1390
(Schroeder, J., dissenting).
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